Embien builds a hardware root of trust into embedded and IoT products from the silicon up — TPM integration, secure boot services, and signed firmware chains engineered by a team that has shipped secure bootloaders for edge devices and mission-critical flight controllers alike.
A root of trust is only as strong as its weakest link, and that link is usually the boot chain: if the first stage that runs after power-on isn't verified, nothing downstream can be trusted either. Our secure boot services start there — immutable first-stage boot code, signature verification at every stage, and, where the platform calls for it, TPM-backed key storage and attestation instead of keys sitting in flash.
Building a genuine hardware root of trust means treating the SoC's specific secure-boot fuses, the TPM's PCR and attestation model, and the bootloader's signature-checking logic as one connected system, not three separate vendor checklists. That's the same discipline behind embedded systems with secure boot support we delivered in a real secure boot service for edge device security. Explore our secure boot for embedded systems hub for the full engineering scope.
Four things security-conscious engineering teams check before trusting a partner with root of trust and TPM integration.
A first-stage boot verified in silicon, anchoring every later stage of the root of trust back to hardware, not software alone.
TPM-backed key storage, attestation, and signing key lifecycle management, kept out of flash where it can be extracted.
A secure bootloader for IoT devices that verifies every image before it runs, with anti-rollback protection built in.
Secure boot services paired with signed, rollback-safe over-the-air updates, so the root of trust holds after deployment too.
A root of trust anchored in SoC-level secure boot fuses and immutable first-stage code.
TPM-backed key storage, attestation, and cryptographic signing for platforms that need it.
Signature verification at every stage of the boot chain, from ROM code through the application.
Bootloaders that only run images signed with a verified, managed key.
Claims about a hardware root of trust are easy to make. Here's a real one: our team built a secure bootloader for an ArduPilot-based drone flight controller on an STM32H7 — a platform where a corrupted or unverified boot isn't just an inconvenience, it's a flight-safety issue. It's the same root of trust and secure boot services discipline behind our edge-device secure boot work, applied to a platform with an even lower tolerance for failure.
Embedded systems with secure boot support need an immutable first-stage boot verified in hardware, a signature-checked chain for every later stage, and a managed signing key — ideally backed by a TPM or equivalent secure element rather than a key stored in plain flash.
Tell us about your SoC and current boot chain. An engineer — not a sales queue — will follow up.